Semantically-Secured Message-Key Trade-off over Wiretap Channels with Random Parameters

Séminaire le 4 Mai 2017, 14h00 à CentraleSupelec (Gif-sur-Yvette) Salle du conseil du L2S - B4.40
Alexander Bunin, Faculty of Electrical Engineering at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Israel.

Modern communication systems usually present an architectural separation between error correction and data encryption. The former is typically realized at the physical layer by transforming the noisy communication channel into a reliable "bit pipe". The data encryption is implemented on top of that by applying cryptographic principles.

Physical layer security (PLS) rooted in information-theoretic principles, is an alternative approach to provably secure communication. This approach dates back to Wyner's celebrated 1975 paper on the wiretap channel (WTC). By harnessing randomness from the noisy communication channel and combining it with proper physical layer coding, PLS guarantees protection against computationally-unlimited eavesdroppers with no requirement that the legitimate parties share a secret key (SK) in advance. The eavesdroppers computational abilities are of no consequence here since the signal he/she observes from the channel carries only negligible information about the secret data.

Two fundamental questions in PLS are those of the best achievable transmission rate of a secret message (SM) over a noisy channel, and the highest attainable SK rate that distributed parties can agree upon. Our work studies the trade-off between SM and SK rates simultaneously achievable over a state-dependent wiretap channel WTC with non-causal channel state information (CSI) at the encoder. This model subsumes all other instances of CSI availability as special cases, and calls for an efficient utilization of the state sequence both for reliability and security purposes. We derive an inner bound on the SM-SK capacity region based on a novel superposition coding scheme. Our inner bound improves upon the previously best known SM-SK trade-off result by Prabhakaran et al., and to the best of our knowledge, upon all other existing lower bounds for either SM or SK for this setup. The results are derived under the strict semantic-security metric that requires negligible information leakage for all message-key distributions. The achievability proof uses the strong soft-covering lemma for superposition codes.
The talk is based on joint work with: Z. Goldfeld and H. H. Permuter (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel), S. Shamai (Technion - Israel Institute of Technology), P. W. Cuff (Princeton University) and P. Piantanida (CentralSupelec).
The work of A. Bunin and S. Shamai has been supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research And Innovation Programme, grant agreement no. 694630.